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ABSTRACT 
This  r e p o r t  p rov ides  an overview of t h e  p r e s e n t  law of o b s c e n i t y  and 
pornography, w i t h  emphasis on t h e  fo l lowing  t o p i c s :  ( 1 )  t h e  l e g a l  d e f i -  
n i t i o n  of o b s c e n i t y ;  ( 2 )  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of r e s t r i c t i v e  zoning l aws ;  
(3)  f e d e r a l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  l e g i s l a t e  i n  t h i s  a r e a ;  ( 4 )  c h i l d  pornography; 
( 5 )  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  b roadcas t  media i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ;  ( 6 )  o b s c e n i t y  and 
c a b l e  t e l e v i s i o n ;  ( 7 )  obscene p re recorded  messages; ( 8 )  s e i z u r e  of obscene 
m a t e r i a l s ;  and .(9) pornography a s  a  form of s e x  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  iii 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . .  DEFINITION OF OBSCENITY: WHAT IS LEGALLY "OBSCENE"? 2 
RESTRICTIVE ZONING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10 
REGULATION OF BROADCASTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
CABLE TELEVISION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 
OBSCENE PRERECORDED MESSAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15 
SEIZURE OF OBSCENE MATERIALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 
. . . . . . . . . . .  PORNOGRAPHY AS A FORM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 19 
OBSCENITY: A LEGAL PRIMER 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution in pertinent 
part provides, "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press." However, despite this absolute language ("no -
law"), historical background and case precedents construing the amendment 
have developed certain exceptions to this apparent absolute right. 
Obscenity is one type of speech which has never been afforded consti- 
tutional protection. This report provides an overview of the present 
state of the law in this area, with particular emphasis on the following 
topics: (1) definition of obscenity; (2) constitutionality of restrictive 
zoning laws; (3) federal authority to legislate in this area; (4) child 
pornography; (5) regulation of the broadcast media in this context; 
(6) obscenity and cable television; (7) obscene prerecorded messages; 
(8) seizure of obscene materials; and (9) pornography as a form of sex 
discrimination. 
DEFINITION OF OBSCENITY: WHAT IS LEGALLY "OBSCENE"? 
In everyday conversation, the terms "pornography" and "obscenity" are 
frequently used interchangeably. In legal parlance, however, these terms are 
not synonymous and the distinctions are important. As explained in the leading 
11 
Supreme Court decision, Miller v. calif ornia; the term "pornography" encom- 
passes all erotic material; while obscenity, derived from the Greek word for 
"filth," is substantially more limited. While obscene material has no consti- 
tutional protection, much pornographic material in fact enjoys such protection. 
The problem which courts have confronted over the years is where to draw the 
line between protected and unprotected speech (the term encompasses both writ- 
ten and spoken material) in this context. 
For nearly-ninety years, American courts attempting to regulate obscenity 
2 1 - 
followed the definition set forth in an 1868 English case, Regina v. Hicklin: 
. . . [Tlhe test of obscenity is . . . whether the tendency . . . is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to 
such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of 
this sort may fall. 
Over the years numerous lower courts expressed dissatisfaction with this 
standard, including Judge Learned Hand's statement in United States v. Kennerly 
that "[tlo put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps 
tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable 
3 / - 4 ;r -- 
seems a fatal policy." A 1933 case, United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 
adopted a new standard, holding that in obscenity prosecutions the effect of a 
- - 
11 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 n. 3 (1973). - 
2/ L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868). - 
3 209 F. 119, 121 (S .D.N.Y. 1913). - 
41 4 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). - 
5 / -
work should be determined by its effect on a "person with average sex instincts." 
From that time on there was a split in judicial reasoning, with some courts 
adopting the Ulysses standard while others continued to folow that set forth in 
6 / -
Hicklin. 
The first Supreme Court ruling on this point came in 1957, in Roth v. 
7 / -
United States. That case redefined the applicable standard as: 
[wlhether to the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. 
This standard proved extremely difficult to apply, and the Court over the 
next several years added and rephrased several elements. The next "watershed" 
standard was that adopted in a 1966 case, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. 
8/ - 
Attorney General of Massachusetts: 
Under [the Roth] definition, as eleborated in-subsequent 
cases, three elements must coalesce: it must be. estab-. 
lished that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken 
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) 
the material is patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary community standards relating to the descrip- 
tion or representation of matters; and (c) the material is 
utterly without redeeming social value. 
This standard, too, underwent several reformulations before it was aban- 
doned by the Court as "unworkable" in Miller v. California, supra. Under the 
Miller standard, which with minor modifications remains in effect today: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must 
be: (a) whether "the average person, applying contem- 
porary community standards" would find that the work, 
5 /  5 F.Supp. at 184. - 
61 Schauer, The Law of Obscenity chap. 1 (1976). - 
7/ 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). - 
8/ 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). - 
taken a s  a whole, appea ls  t o  t h e  p r u r i e n t  i n t e r e s t ;  
(b) whether t h e  work d e p i c t s  o r  desc r ibes ,  i n  a 
p a t e n t l y  o f f ens ive  way, sexual  conduct s p e c i f i c a l l y  de- 
f i n e d  by t h e  app l i cab le  s t a t e  law; and (c )  whether t he  
work, taken a s  a whole, l a c k s  s e r i o u s  l i t e r a r y ,  a r t i s -  
t i c ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  o r  s c i e n t i f i c  value.  zf 
The primary d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  Memoirs and t h e  M i l l e r  s tandards  i s  
t h a t ,  under M i l l e r ,  t h e  m a t e r i a l  need no longer  be " u t t e r l y  without  redeeming 
s o c i a l  va luef f  t o  q u a l i f y  a s  l e g a l l y  obscene. 
The Supreme Court r e c e n t l y  reaff i rmed t h e  M i l l e r  s tandard  i n  Brocket t  v. 
10/  -
Spokane Arcades, Inc . ,  a case  which p a r t i a l l y  i nva l ida t ed  a Washington S t a t e  
"publ ic  nuisancef '  obsceni ty  s t a t u t e  which used t h e  term " lus t "  a s  p a r t  of i ts  
d e f i n i t i o n .  The Court he ld  t h a t  t h i s  term was overbroad i n  t h e  context  of t h e  
challenged s t a t u t e ,  i n  t h a t  i t  could be read a s  encompassing m a t e r i a l s  which 
evoke a normal, hea l thy  i n t e r e s t  i n  sex  (as  opposed t o  a. morbid, perverse  in- 
t e r e s t )  and thus  reach m a t e r i a l s  which a r e  cons t i t u t io r i a l l y  p ro t ec t ed .  How- 
ever ,  i t  r e i t e r a t e d  i ts  approval  of t h e  M i l l e r  s tandard  a s  t h a t  which should 
be  appl ied  i n  obsceni ty  determinat ions.  
Under t h i s  s tandard  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  much, i f  no t  most, m a t e r i a l  dep ic t ing  
sexual  a c t i v i t y  i s  not  l e g a l l y  obscene p e r  s e a  FOP example, i t  may not  be 
c l e a r  "beyond a reasonable  doubt" ( t h e  s tandard  i n  c r imina l  prosecut ions)  
whether "contemporary community s tandardsf f  would condemn t h e  chal lenged m a t e r i a l ,  
o r  whether i t  i s  "pa t en t ly  of fens ive ."  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  work "taken a s  a whole" 
must l a c k  s e r i o u s  l i t e r a r y ,  a r t i s t i c ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  o r  s c i e n t i f i c  va lue  poses 
another  problem, a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  po r t ion  of t h e  work may i n  f a c t  be obscene, 
bu t  t h e  o v e r a l l  work is  not .  (The second element of t he  t r i p a r t i t e  t e s t  simply 
9 /  413 U.S. a t  23. - 
101 105 S.Ct. 2794 (1985). - 
reflects the general rule that criminal statutes must be written with suffi- 
cient specificity so that those accused of violating them receive adequate 
notice of the wrongful nature of their acts.) 
Also, the 'kontemporary community standards" criteria seemingly precludes 
the implementation of a national obscenity standard, as community standards 
may differ significantly in different parts of the country. Although the 
above Miller language indicates that state law is to be utilized in analyzing 
the questionable material, other language in that same opinion indicates that 
local standards of smaller communities, as shown perhaps through city or 
county obscenity ordinances, might be used for this purpose. This standard 
has led to situations such as that involving the motion picture "Deep Throat," 
121 - 131 
which was bannkd in ~altimoreTut allowed to run in Binghamton, New York. 
RESTRICTIVE ZONING 
, , 
If the government cannot flatly prohibit non-obscene sexually oriented 
materials and performances, may it constitutionally restrict the location of 
businesses which offer such goods or activities? Such restrictive zoning 
ordinances typically take one of two opposite approaches: either they require 
that such establishments be widely dispersed, or they require that they be 
concentrated within a given area. Detroit's "dispersal" ordinance was upheld 
141 -
by the Supreme Court in a 1976 case, Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. 
That Court has not yet ruled on a "concentration" ordinance, but lower courts 
acting on a case by case basis have upheld those not found to be unreasonably 
restrictive of protected constitutional rights. 
121 Mangum v. State's Attorney, 275 Md. 450, 341 A.2d 786 (1975). -
131 People v. Binghamton Theaters, Inc., Binghamton City Ct., Dec. 16, 1972. -
141 427 U.S. 50 (1976). -
Young involved an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" which prohibited the location 
of an adult theater within 1,000 feet of any two other "regulated uses1' (in- 
cluding establishments such as adult book stores, cabarets, bars, taxi dance 
halls, and hotels ) or within 500 feet of a residential area. In upholding 
this ordinance, the Court found that there was a reasonable relationship be- 
tween its land-use regulation and the city's interest in neighborhood preserva- 
tion and the health, safety and welfare of its residents: 
The record discloses a factual basis for the Common 
Council's conclusion that this kind of restriction will 
have the desired effect . . . . [T]he city's interest 
in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is 
one that must be accorded high respect. Moreover, the 
city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experi- 
ment with solutions to admittedly serious problems. 151 
The key efement in this holding was that the Council was able to document 
16/, - 
ts "conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect." 
Thus this case should be distinguished from the Supreme Court's rulings in 
- 3 - 1  
1 1 1  -
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, which held facially invalid as an infringe- 
ment of the first amendment an ordinance which prohibited a drive-in movie 
theater from exhibiting films containing nudity when the screen was visible 
from a public street or public place (which was true for all drive-in movies); 
181 -
and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, which struck down an ordinance exclud- 
ing live entertainment (in this case, nude dancers) from a broad range of com- 
mercial uses permitted in the borough. In each case the Court held that the 
government in question failed to provide sufficient justification for its 
blanket prohibition of a constitutionally-protected activity. 
Id. at 71. -
171 422 U.S. 205 (1975). -
The Supreme Court has now agreed to review a decision by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of 
19 I -
Renton, which invalidated a Renton, Washington, ordinance prohibiting adult 
movie theaters within LOO0 feet of residential zones, single- or multi-family 
buildings, churches, or schools. The ninth circuit held that the ordinance 
imposed a substantial restriction of speech and that the city did not show a 
substantial governmental interest sufficient to justify this restriction. It 
distinguished the Renton situation from that present in Young by noting that 
there was no showing in Young that the ordinance seriously limited the number 
of sites available for adult theaters, while the Renton ordinance's prohibition 
would result in a substantial restriction on this activity. 
As noted above, "concentrated" zoning ordinances have been upheld in this 
context by lower courts as long as they are not found to be unduly restrictive. 
201 -
See, e.g.j Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, which held that the government -
need not guarantee "choice comercial sites" for those wishing to sell erotic 
211 -
materials; and City of Minot v. Central Avenue News, Inc., which upheld a con- 
centration ordinance which reserved a substantial area for adult entertainment. 
221 
On the other hand, Purple Onion, Inc. v. ~ackson7truck down an Atlanta ordi- 
nance which designated 81 sites within an area as appropriate for adult busi- 
nesses, finding that "no more than three or four . . . [were] sites a reasonably 
prudent investor" would consider. Similarly, the court in E & B Enterprises v. 
231 -
City of University Park invalidated an ordinance which it found had been 
191 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. -
Apr. 15, 1985)(No. 84-1360). 
201 514 F.Supp. 975, 982 (S.D. Tex. 1981). -
22/ 511 F.Supp. 1207, 1216 (N.D. Ga. 1981). -
23/ 449 F.Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977). -
designed t o  "run out  of town" an a d u l t  movie t h e a t e r .  Under t h a t  ordinance,  
only two s u i t a b l e  s i t e s  were a v a i l a b l e  f o r  showing a d u l t  f i l m s ,  one of which 
w a s  owned by t h e  c i t y  and t h e  o t h e r  by a  competing i n t e r e s t .  Also, t h e r e  was 
no evidence such a s  t h a t  presented i n  Young t h a t  t h e  t h e a t e r  had l e d  t o  neigh- 
borhood d e t e r i o r a t i o n  o r  an otherwise unsafe o r  unhealthy environment. 
FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
Under t h e  Cons t i t u t ion ,  t he  f e d e r a l  government has only l imi t ed  a u t h o r i t y  
t o  l e g i s l a t e  on obsceni ty.  A r t .  I ,  5 8, of t h e  Cons t i t u t ion ,  t h e  so-cal led 
-enumerated powers clause" which s p e c i f i e s  a r e a s  i n  which Congress is  author ized  
t o  l e g i s l a t e ,  does not  on i t s  f a c e  encompass obsceni ty  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Thus, under 
t h a t  c l ause  and t h e  t e n t h  amendment, genera l  a u t h o r i t y  t o  l e g i s l a t e  on t h a t  sub- 
j e c t  i s  r e s e w e d  t o  t h e  ind iv idua l  s t a t e s .  Most s t a t e s  have i n  t u r n  de lega ted  
a po r t ion  of t h i s  a u t h o r i t y  t o  lower governmental e n t i t i e s  such a s  count ies  
and mun ic ipa l i t i e s .  
However, two s e c t i o n s  of t h e  enumerated powers c lause ,  § 3,  which i n  p e r t i -  
nent  p a r t  au tho r i zes  Congress " [ t l o  r e g u l a t e  commerce wi th  fo re ign  Nations,  and 
among t h e  s e v e r a l  S t a t e s ; "  and § 7 ,  which au tho r i zes  t h e  es tab l i shment  of "Post 
Off ices  and Pos t  Roads," se rve  a s  t h e  b a s i s ,  o r  nexus, f o r  t he  fol lowing pro- 
241 -
h i b i t i o n s  i n  t he  f e d e r a l  c r imina l  code: mail ing obscene ma t t e r ;  impor ta t ion  
251 -
o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of obscene ma t t e r ;  mail ing indecent  mat te r  i n  wrappers o r  
261 - 2 7  / -
envelopes; broadcast ing indecent ,  profane o r  obscene language; and t r ans -  
24/ 18 U.S.C. § 1461. -
25/ 18 U.S.C. 5 1462. -
261 18  U.S.C. § 1463. -
27/ 18 U.S.C. 5 1464. -
281 -
portation of obscene matters for sale or distribution. In addition, the 
29 I 
Federal Sexual Exploitation of Children ~ct- specifically prohibits the pro- 
duction, mailing, or transportation of materials depicting minors involved in 
sexually explicit conduct. 
30 I 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984- added violations of various 
state and federal obscenity statutes to the listing of predicate offenses en- 
compassed by the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations [RICO] 
311 -
law. RICO imposes criminal penalties on those who acquire or conduct an 
"enterprise" engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce through a 
"pattern of racketter activity," which term as amended now includes all state 
and federal obscenity violations which carry a maximum sentence of at least one 
year' s imprisonment. 
321 
There are also federal statutory provisions'- which authorize a person who 
does not wish to receive pandering advertisements sent through the mail to re- 
quest that the mailer(s) of such materials refrain from sending any further such 
mailings to his or her address. This statute is not limited to legally .obscene 
materials but includes any materials "which the addressee in his sole discretion 
331 -
believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative." This language is 
arguably broad enough to encompass any unwanted advertisement, regardless of 
content, an interpretation accepted and upheld as constitutional by the Supreme 
291 18 U.S.C. 5 5  2251 to 2253. -
30/ P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837. -
311 18 U.S.C. 5 5  1961 to 1968. -
321 39 U.S.C. 0 5  3008, 3010, 3011. -
331 39 U.S.C. 5 3008(a). -
341 -
Court  i n  Rowan v .  P o s t  O f f i c e  Department: 
We . . . c a t e g o r i c a l l y  r e j e c t  t h e  argument t h a t  a  
vendor  h a s  a  r i g h t  under  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o r  o t h e r -  
w i s e  t o  send unwanted m a t e r i a l  i n t o  t h e  home of 
a n o t h e r .  If  t h i s  p r o h i b i t i o n  o p e r a t e s  t o  inpede  
t h e  f low of even v a l i d  i d e a s ,  t h e  answer is  t h a t  no 
one  h a s  a r i g h t  t o  p r e s s  even "good" i d e a s  on an  
u n w i l l i n g  r e c i p i e n t  . . . . The a s s e r t e d  r i g h t  
of a mailer, we r e p e a t ,  s t o p s  a t  t h e  o u t e r  boundary 
of every  p e r s o n ' s  domain. 
Upon r e c e i p t  o f  a  r e q u e s t  from a  p o s t a l  p a t r o n  t h a t  he  o r  s h e  does  n o t  
d e s i r e  t o  r e c e i v e  such  m a i l i n g s  from a s p e c i f i e d  s o u r c e ,  t h e  P o s t a l  S e r v i c e  
i s s u e s  an  o r d e r  p r o h i b i t i n g  f u t u r e  m a i l i n g s  from t h a t  s o u r c e  as of 30 days  
a f t e r  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  d a t e  of t h e  o r d e r ,  which i s  t h e  30 th  c a l e n d a r  day f o l -  
lowing i ts  r e c e i p t .  I f  t h e  P o s t a l  S e r v i c e  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  any p e r s o n  is  v i o l a t i n g  
such an o r d e r ,  i t  nay r e q u e s t  t h e  At to rney  General  t o  commence a c i v i l  a c t i o n  
a g a i n s t  t h a t  p a r t y ,  s e e k i n g  v a r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e  forms o f  r e l i e f  t o  i n s u r e  t h a t  
t h e  o b j e c t i o n a b l e ' m a i l i n g s  a r e  n o t  r e p e a t e d .  R e l a t e d  c r i m i n a l  p e n a l t i e s  f o r  
t h e  v i o l a t i o n  of such  o r d e r s  may b e  imposed o n l y  when t h e  m a i l i n g s  do i n  
35 1 -
f a c t  c o n t a i n  s e x u a l l y  e x p l i c i t  m a t e r i a l s .  
Problems invo lved  w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b l e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a n a t i o n a l  o b s c e n i t y  
s t a n d a r d  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  under " D e f i n i t i o n  of Obsceni ty ,"  s u p r a  pp. 4-5. 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
36/ 
I n  J u l y  1982 t h e  Supreme Court  r u l e d  i n  New York v .  ~ e r b e r -  t h a t  s t a t e s ,  
and by analogy t h e  f e d e r a l  government, can c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  r e g u l a t e  t h e  pro- 
d u c t i o n  and d i s t r i b u t i o n  of m a t e r i a l  which d e p i c t s  minors  engaged i n  s e x u a l  
341 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).  -
351 1 8  U.S.C. 5 1737. -
361 458 U.S. 747 (1982).  -
a c t i v i t y  even when such m a t e r i a l  i s  not  l e g a l l y  obscene. The cour t  gave f i v e  
r e l a t e d  reasons f o r  i t s  holding: (1) t h e  s t a t e ' s  l e g i s l a t i v e  judgment t h a t  
t h e  use  of ch i ld ren  a s  s u b j e c t s  of pornographic ma te r i a l s  is harmful t o  t h e i r  
phys io log ica l ,  emotional,  and mental h e a l t h  e a s i l y  passes  muster under t h e  
f i r s t  amendment; ( 2 )  t h e  obsceni ty  s tandard  s e t  f o r t h  i n  M i l l e r  v. C a l i f o r n i a ,  
supra,  is  no t  a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  s o l u t i o n  t o  t he  c h i l d  pornography problem; (3) 
the  a d v e r t i s i n g  and s e l l i n g  of c h i l d  pornography provides an economic motive f o r  
and is  thus  an i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of t h e  product ion of such m a t e r i a l s ,  an a c t i v i t y  
which is i l l e g a l  throughout t h e  country;  ( 4 )  t he  i n t r i n s i c  va lue  of permi t t ing  
l i v e  performances and photographic reproduct ions of ch i ld ren  engaged i n  lewd ex- 
h i b i t i o n s  is  extremely modest, i f  n o t  & minimis; and (5) recognizing and c l a s s i -  
fy ing  c h i l d  pornography a s  a  category of m a t e r i a l  o u t s i d e  t h e  scope of f i r s t  
amendment p r o t e c t i o n  is  not  incompatible wi th  e a r l i e r  Supreme Court dec i s ions  
a s  t o  what speech i s  unprotected.  The Court concluded: 
When a  de f inab le  c l a s s  of m a t e r i a l s ,  such a s  t h a t  
covered by [ t h e  p e r t i n e n t  New York s t a t u t e ] ,  bea r s  so  
heav i ly  and pervas ive ly  on t h e  wel fare  of c h i l d r e n  engaged 
i n  t h e  product ion,  we th ink  t h e  balance of competing in- 
t e r e s t s  i s  c l e a r l y  s t r u c k  and t h a t  i t  i s  permiss ib le  t o  
cons ider  t hese  m a t e r i a l s  a s  without  t he  p r o t e c t i o n  of t he  
F i r s t  Amendment. 371 
Again, t he  M i l l e r  obsceni ty s tandard provides:  
The b a s i c  gu ide l ines  f o r  t he  t r i e r  of f a c t  must be: 
(a )  Whether " the  average person, applying contempor- 
a r y  community s tandards" would f i n d  t h a t  t h e  work, 
taken a s  a  whole, appea ls  t o  t h e  p r u r i e n t  i n t e r e s t ;  
(b) whether t h e  work d e p i c t s  o r  desc r ibes ,  i n  a  
p a t e n t l y  o f f ens ive  way, sexual  conduct s p e c i f i c a l l y  
def ined  by t h e  app l i cab le  S t a t e  law; and (c )  whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 381 
The Ferber Court adjusted the Miller formulation as follows, where 
material depicting children engaged in sexual activity is involved: 
A trier of fact need not find that the material ap- 
peals to the prurient interest of the average person; 
it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be 
done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material 
at issue need not be considered as a whole. E/ 
Under the Ferber standard, only a small portion of this material, that 
which does not involve live performances by the children depicted, remains con- 
stitutionally protected. However, the conduct in question cannot be prohibited 
unless it is adequately defined by the applicable law as written or authorita- 
tively construed. 
Although the decision was unanimous to the material involved in that par- 
ticular case, two films devoted.almost exclusively to depicting young boys 
masturbating, Justices Stevens, Brennan and Marshall argued that constitutional 
protection should be afforded to material depicting minors engaged in sexual 
activity where that material has serious literary, scientific, or educational 
value. The Ferber decision holds, however, that states and the federal govern- 
ment can constitutionally regulate all such material, regardless of any intrin- 
sic value it might possess. 
Federal law has now been brought into line with the Ferber decision (i.e., 
the requirement that the proscribed material be legally obscene was dropped) 
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with the enactment of the Child Protection Act of 1984. 
381 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). -
391 458 U.S. at 764. -
401 Pub. L. 98-292, 98 Stat. 292. -
REGULATION OF BROADCASTING 
J u d i c i a l  precedents  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  a  much g r e a t e r  measure of c o n t r o l  i s  
pe rmis s ib l e  w i th  regard  t o  t h e  broadcast  media than t o  t h e i r  non-broadcast 
coun te rpa r t s .  The r a t i o n a l e  behind t h i s  po l i cy  is  t h a t ,  a t  l e a s t  t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  
everyone i s  equa l ly  f r e e  t o  w r i t e ,  speak, and publ i sh ;  t h e r e  i s  no volume l i m i -  
t a t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  amount which may be spoken o r  publ ished.  This  is  i n  sharp  
c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  broadcas t  media, where t h e r e  i s  only a  f i n i t e  range of frequen- 
c i e s  ava i l ab l e .  Thus, whi le  t h e  M i l l e r  obsceni ty  s tandard  d e f i n i t e l y  a p p l i e s  
41/ 
i n  t h i s  contex t ,  t he  p e r t i n e n t  f e d e r a l  c r imina l  s ta tu te -  p r o h i b i t s  " u t t e r  [ i ng ]  
any obscene, indecent  o r  profane language by means of r a d i o  communication." 
This  broader  s tandard  a s  def ined  below was upheld a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  by t h e  
42 / -
Supreme Court i n  a  1978 dec i s ion ,  FCC v. P a c i f i c a  Foundation. 
The P a c i f i c a  case  a rose  from t h e  a f te rnoon r a d i o  broadcast  of a  George .. 
Car l in  record which used "seven d i r t y  words" found by the  FCC t o  be " indecent ,"  
and thus  i n  v i o l a t i o n  of f e d e r a l  law, al though they were found not  t o  be l e g a l l y  
"obscene." The FCC's d e f i n i t i o n  of what is  "indecent" f o r  t h i s  purpose inc ludes  
"language t h a t  desc r ibes  i n  terms p a t e n t l y  o f f e n s i v e  a s  measured by contem- 
porary commmity s tandards  f o r  t h e  broadcast  medium, sexual  o r  excre tory  a c t i -  
v i t i e s  and organs,  a t  t imes of t h e  day when t h e r e  is  a reasonable r i s k  t h a t  
43/ -
c h i l d r e n  may be i n  t h e  audience." This  d i f f e r s  from t h e  M i l l e r  obsceni ty  
s tandard  i n  t h a t  t h e  indecent  programming need not  appeal  t o  t he  p r u r i e n t  in- 
t e r e s t ;  i t  need no t  be taken a s  a  whole when applying contemporary community 
41/ 18 U.S.C. 5 1464. -
42/ 438 U.S. 726 (1978). -
43/ P a c i f i c a  Foundation, 56 FCC 2d 94, 98 (1975). -
s t a n d a r d s ;  and i t  may, i n  some c o n t e x t ,  have s e r i o u s  l i t e r a r y ,  a r t i s t i c ,  
p o l i t i c a l  o r  s c i e n t i f i c  v a l u e .  
I n  upholding t h i s  s t a n d a r d  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  t h e  Supreme Court  emphasized 
t h a t  b r o a d c a s t i n g  i n v o l v e s  " the  p r i v a c y  of t h e  home, where t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
r i g h t  t o  b e  l e f t  a l o n e  p l a i n l y  outweighs  t h e  F i r s t  Amendment r i g h t s  of an 
i n t r u d e r  [ c i t i n g  Rowan v .  P o s t  O f f i c e  Dept. ,  s u p r a ]  . . . . [and]  p r i o r  warn- 
i n g s  cannot  comple te ly  p r o t e c t  t h e  l i s t e n e r  o r  v iewer  from unexpected program 
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con ten t . "  A s  no ted  above,  t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  s t a n d a r d  is  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  "times of 
day when t h e r e  i s  a r e a s o n a b l e  r i s k  t h a t  c h i l d r e n  may b e  i n  t h e  aud ience ;"  
t h e  Court  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of whether  b r o a d c a s t i n g  t h e  
same programming a t  a later  hour  when c h i l d r e n  were  less l i k e l y  t o  be  l i s t e n i n g  
would be  a c c e p t a b l e  "is a n  i s s u e  n e i t h e r  t h e  Commission nor  t h i s  Court  h a s  
45 I -
dec ided .  " 
CABLE TELEVISION 
Another q u e s t i o n  which h a s  n o t  y e t  been cons idered  by t h e  Supreme Court  i s  
whether  t h e  M i l l e r  o b s c e n i t y  s t a n d a r d  o r  t h e  l e s s e r  P a c i f i c a  indecency s t a n d a r d ,  
o r  pe rhaps  some i n t e r m e d i a t e  s t a n d a r d ,  a p p l i e s  t o  programming p r e s e n t e d  on c a b l e  
t e l e v i s i o n .  However, i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  lower c o u r t s  which have cons idered  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  have c o n s i s t e n t l y  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  more s t r i n g e n t  M i l l e r  s t a n d a r d  
shou ld  a p p l y ,  because  of t h e  numerous d i s t i n c t i o n s  which can be  made between 
46/ -
c a b l e  and over - the -a i r  t e l e v i s i o n  b r o a d c a s t i n g .  
- -- - 
441 438 U.S. a t  748. -
451 I d .  a t  750 n. 28. - -
461 E.g., Cruz v .  F e r r e ,  571  F.Supp. 125 (S.D. F l a .  1983) ;  Home Box O f f i c e  
v. ~ i E i n s o n ,  531 F.Supp. 986 (D. Utah.1982) : Community T e l e v i s i o n  of Utah v .  
Roy C i t y ,  555 F.Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982) .  
Cable does not utilize the radio frequency'spectrum for its over-the- 
air transmission, so there is no scarcity of frequencies comparable to that 
which serves as the basis for the more stringent regulation of broadcast media 
(i.e., there is no limit to the number of cable channels which can be trans- 
mitted from or received at a given location). Cable does not "invade the home" 
as is true of the broadcast media, in that customers voluntarily subscribe to 
the service and must pay a fee in order to obtain it. Finally, technology is 
available to "lock out" certain channels on a cable system both at the cable 
office and in the home, providing still more consumer control over the type 
of programming received. For example, a parent can "lock outf' those channels 
throught unsuitable for viewing by their children. For these reasons, cable 
is arguably more comparable to the print and cinema industries, to which the 
Miller standard applies, than to the television and radio industries, which 
are coSered by ~acifica. 
47/ 
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984- enacted the following pro- 
hibition: 
Whoever transmits over any cable system any matter 
which is obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Consti- 
tution of the United States shall be fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. %/ 
This flexible language was adopted so that the law will not have to be amended 
should the pertinent constitutional standard be revised. 
OBSCENE PRERECORDED MESSAGES 
In December 1983, Congress amended the prohibition against obscene or 
harassing telephone calls in interstate commerce to include prerecorded obscene 
47/ Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2801. -
48/ 47 U.S.C. 5 559. -
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messages,  p o p u l a r l y  known a s  "dial-a-porn." However, t h e  f i r s t  r e g u l a t i o n s  
promulgated under  t h i s  amendment, which were aimed a t  r e s t r i c t i n g  a c c e s s  by 
50/ -
minors t o  t h e s e  r e c o r d i n g s ,  were i n v a l i d a t e d  by t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  Court  of 
51/ -
Appeals f o r  t h e  Second C i r c u i t  i n  C a r l i n  Communications, Inc .  v .  FCC. The 
c o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  FCC had f a i l e d  t o  demons t ra te  t h a t  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  were  
w e l l - t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e  ends  i n t e n d e d  t o  b e  advanced by t h e  s t a t u t e  o r  t h a t  t h o s e  
ends  could  n o t  have been met by l e s s  d r a s t i c  a c t i o n s .  Those r e g u l a t i o n s  had 
r e q u i r e d  t h a t  "dial-a-porn" s e r v i c e s  be  o p e r a t e d  o n l y  between t h e  hours  of 
9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a .m.  E a s t e r n  Time o r  t h a t  payment b e  made by c r e d i t  c a r d  
p r i o r  t o  t r a n s m i s s i o n  of t h e  message. 
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I n  October  1985, t h e  FCC a g a i n  i s s u e d  f i n a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e r  
Under t h e s e  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  p r o v i d e r s  of "dial-a-porn" s e r v i c e s  must r e q u i r e  an 
a u t h o r i z e d  a c c e s s  o r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  code o r  prepayment by c r e d i t  c a r d  b e f o r e  
t r a n s m i s s i o n  of t h e  messages.  The p r o v i d e r  must i s s u e  t h e  code by m a i l  a f t e r  
r easonab ly  a s c e r t a i n i n g ,  through a  w r i t t e n  a p p l i c a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h a t  t h e  ap- 
p l i c a n t  i s  a t  l e a s t  1 8  y e a r s  of age.  Also ,  p r o v i d e r s  must e s t a b l i s h  a procedure  
whereby codes  w i l l  be  cance led  immediately when p r o v i d e r s  a r e  n o t i f i e d  t h a t  
t h e y  a r e  l o s t ,  s t o l e n  o r  misused,  o r  no l o n g e r  r e q u i r e d ,  
SEIZURE OF OBSCENE MATERIALS 
The f o u r t h  amendment" p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  unreasonab le  s e a r c h e s  and 
s e i z u r e s  g e n e r a l l y  r e q u i r e s  t h e  i s s u a n c e  of a  w a r r a n t  p r i o r  t o  t a k i n g  any 
such  a c t i o n ;  and t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of p r o t e c t e d  f i r s t  
Pub. L. 98-214, 97 S t a t .  1469, amending 47 U.S.C. 5 223. 
49 Fed. Reg. 24996, 25003 (1984) .  
749 F.2d 113 (2d C i r .  1984) .  
50 Fed. Reg. 24699 (1985).  
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amendment rights. As the Supreme Court explained in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 
"The Bill of Rights was fashioned against the background of knowledge that un- 
restricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stif- 
ling liberty of expression." Thus numerous cases indicate that particular 
care must be taken with regard to searches for and seizures of allegedly ob- 
scene materials to insure that first amendment rights are in fact protected. 
541 -
For example, in Roaden v. Kentucky, a county sheriff, after viewing a 
sexually explicit film at a local drive-in theater, arrested the theater mana- 
ger for exhibiting an obscene film and seized, without a warrant, one copy of 
the film for use as evidence. There was no prior judicial determination of 
obscenity. The Supreme Court explained that this search was unreasonable, "not 
simply because.it would have been easy to secure a warrant, but rather because 
prior restraint of the right of expression, whether by -books or films, calls 
for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness. The setting of the 
bookstore or the courmercial theater, each presumptively under the protection 
of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements be- 




In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. Mew York, a police investigator purchased two 
films from an adult bookstore and, after viewing them and concluding that they 
were obscene, took the films to a town justice who also viewed them. Based 
on an affidavit by the investigator, the justice issued a warrant authorizing 
531 376 U.S. 717, 729 (1961). -
541 413 U.S. 496 (1973). -
551 Id. at 504 (footnote omitted). - -
561 422 U.S. 319 (1979). -
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s e i z u r e  of o t h e r  copies  of t h e  two f i lms  and "the fol lowing items which the  
Court independent ly [on examination] has determined t o  be possessed i n  v io l a -  
t ionl 'of t h e  law. However, a t  t h e  time t h e  j u s t i c e  s igned t h e  warrant  no i tems 
were l i s t e d  o r  descr ibed  fol lowing the  s ta tement ,  which was i ssued  on the  
b a s i s  of t h e  a f f i d a v i t ' s  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  "s imi la r"  f i l m s  and p r i n t e d  mat te r  
po r t r ay ing  s i m i l a r  a c t i v i t i e s  could be found on the  premises.  The r e s u l t i n g  
search ,  which l a s t e d  nea r ly  s i x  hours and r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  s e i z u r e  of a l a r g e  
volume of m a t e r i a l ,  was he ld  t o  v i o l a t e  t he  fou r th  amendment. 
571 -
Lee A r t  Thea t re ,  Inc. v. V i rg in i a  involved the  s e i z u r e  of motion p i c t u r e s  
under a u t 5 o r i t y  of a warrant  i s sued  by a j u s t i c e  of t he  peace. The warrant  was 
i ssued  on t h e  b a s i s  of an a f f i d a v i t  of a p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  which contained only 
t h e  t i t l e s  o f - t h e  f i l m s  and a s ta tement  t h a t  t he  o f f i c e r  had determined from 
personal  observa t ion  of them and of t h e  b i l l b o a r d  i n  f r o n t  of t he  t h e a t e r  where 
they were being shown t h a t  t h e  f i lms  were obscene. This s e i z u r e ,  too ,  was 
dec lared  uncons t i t u t iona l .  
581 
However, t he  Supreme Court r e c e n t l y  ru l ed  i n  Macon v .  ~ a r y l a n d 7 h a t  t h e  
undercover purchase of obscene ma te r i a l s  i s  no t  an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  search  o r  
s e i z u r e  s i n c e  a commercial s a l e  does not  c o n s t i t u t e  e i t h e r  a search  o r  a 
s e i zu re .  It i s  no t  a search  because t h e  s e l l e r  does no t  have any reasonable 
expec ta t ion  of pr ivacy  i n  a r eas  of t h e  s t o r e  where t h e  publ ic  is i n v i t e d  t o  
e n t e r  and t o  t r a n s a c t  bus iness ;  nor i s  i t  a s e i zu re ,  s i n c e  the  s e l l e r  volun- 
t a r i l y  t r a n s f e r s  any possessory i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  goods t o  t h e  purchaser  upon 
r e c e i p t  of t he  funds. The dec i s ion  expands p o l i c e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  a c t  a g a i n s t  
obsceni ty bu t  a s  y e t  i t s  p r a c t i c a l  impact i s  uncer ta in .  
571 392 U.S. 636 (1968) (E~_T curiam) . -
58/ 105 S.Ct. 2794 (1985). -
PORNOGRAPHY AS A FORM OF SEX DISCREIINATION 
I n  1984 t h e  c i t y  counci l s  of Minneapolis and Ind ianapo l i s  each adopted 
an ordinance which def ined  pornography dep ic t ing  abuse of women a s  a form of 
59 / - - ,  
sex  d i sc r imina t ion ,  and hence a c i v i l  r i g h t s  v i o l a t i o n .  The f4inneapolis 
ordinance was vetoed by the  Mayor, and t h a t  i n  Ind ianapo l i s  en jo ined  on f i r s t  
amendment grounds by t h e  United S t a t e s  Court of Appeals f o r  t h e  Seventh C i r c u i t  
60 / -
i n  American Booksel lers  Ass'n, Inc.  v .  Hudnut. However, t h e  ques t ions  pre- 
sen ted  i n  t h a t  case  have no t  y e t  been d e f i n i t i v e l y  s e t t l e d .  
Both t h e  Minneapolis C i ty  Council and t h e  Ind ianapo l i s  City-County Council  
made d e t a i l e d  f ind ings  t h a t  pornography he lps  c r e a t e  and maintain i n e q u a l i t y  
between t h e  sexes  and thus  d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  harms women i n  a number of ways. Each 
ordinance contained a d e t a i l e d  d e f i n i t i o n  of pornography a s  t h e  sexua l ly  exp l i -  
c i t  subord ina t ion  of women, g raph ica l ly  dep ic t ed ,  t h a t - i n c l u d e s  one o r  more 
' . 
a d d i t i o n a l  elements such a s  present ing  women who apparent ly  enjoy pa in  o r  muti- 
l a t i o n ,  o r  women a s  s exua l  o b j e c t s  who a r e  t i e d  up, c u t  up, bru ised  o r  physi- 
c a l l y  h u r t .  The fou r  types of p roh ib i t ed  d iscr imina tory  p r a c t i c e s  based on 
t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  inc lude  coerc ion  i n t o  performing f o r  pornography, fo rc ing  por- 
nography on a person, a s s a u l t  o r  phys i ca l  a t t a c k  due t o  pornography, and t r a f -  
f i c k i n g  i n  pornography. Men were given a s i m i l a r  cause of a c t i o n  i f  they could 
demonstrate t h a t  comparable male-oriented pornography r e s u l t e d  i n  a comparable 
i n ju ry .  The ordinances were c i v i l  r a t h e r  than c r imina l  i n  na tu re ,  s o  they 
imposed c i v i l  s anc t ions  r a t h e r  than c r imina l  f i n e s  and/or  imprisonment on 
v i o l a t o r s .  
59/ Minneapolis Code of Ordinances 5 139 .10 (a ) ( l ) ,  a s  proposed by Ordinance 
83-0rT23,  5 1 ;  Ind ianapo l i s  City-County Ordinance No,. 24, 1984. 
601 771 F.2d 323 (7 th  C i r .  1985).  -
The s u i t  c h a l l e n g i n g  t h e  I n d i a n a p o l i s  o rd inance  was o r i g i n a l l y  heard  by 
611 -
t h e  F e d e r a l  D i s t r i c t  Court  f o r  t h e  Southern D i s t r i c t  of I n d i a n a .  It h e l d  t h a t  
much of t h e  m a t e r i a l  i t  encompassed w a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p r o t e c t e d ,  s i n c e  i t  
w a s  n o t  l e g a l l y  obscene and d i d  n o t  i n c i t e  t o  lawbreaking and imminent l a w l e s s  
621 
a c t i o n  as r e q u i r e d  by t h e  Supreme Cour t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in Brandenburg v .  0 h i o T o r  
s u p p r e s s i o n  on t h i s  ground. Tha t  c o u r t ,  w h i l e  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
governmental  i n t e r e s t  i n  e l i m i n a t i n g  s e x  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  h e l d  t h a t  t h i s  i n t e r e s t  
was n o t  s o  s t r o n g  as t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  s u p p r e s s i o n  of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p r o t e c t e d  
speech  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  e n v i s i o n e d  by t h e  I n d i a n a p o l i s  o rd inance .  The c i r c u i t  
Court  d i d  n o t  a d d r e s s  t h e s e  i s s u e s ;  i t  r a t h e r  viewed t h e  o rd inance  as a n  imper- 
631 -
m i s s i b l e  a t t e m p t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  " thought  c o n t r o l "  and based i t s  d e c i s i o n  on 
t h e  long  l i n e  of Supreme Court  c a s e s  which h o l d  t h a t  thoughts  i n  and of them- 
s e l v e s ,  no matter now r e p r e h e n s i b l e  o r  repugnan t ,  cannot  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  b e  
641 -
p e n a l i z e d .  
Those who s u p p o r t  t h i s  approach t o  r e g u l a t i n g  pornography a r g u e  t h a t  t h e r e  
is  i n  f a c t  a s t r o n g  c o r r e l a t i o n  between m a t e r i a l  p o r t r a y i n g  s e x u a l  abuse  of 
651 -
women and a c t u a l  abuse  of women. However, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e m p i r i c a l l y  
61/ 598 F.Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind.  1984) .  - -
621 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  I n  d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  i n c i t e m e n t  s t a n d a r d ,  t h e  
~ o u r t y t a t e d :  " [Tlhe c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g u a r a n t e e s  of f r e e  speech  and f r e e  p r e s s  
do n o t  pe rmi t  a  S t a t e  t o  f o r b i d  o r  p r o s c r i b e  advocacy of t h e  u s e  of f o r c e  o r  
law v i o l a t i o n  e x c e p t  where such advocacy i s  d i r e c t e d  t o  i n c i t i n g  o r  producing 
imminent l a w l e s s  a c t i o n  and i s  l i k e l y  t o  i n c i t e  o r  produce such a c t i o n . "  Id. 
a t  447. 
64/ E.g., Brandenburg v .  Ohio, s u p r a  n o t e  62 ( i d e a s  of t h e  Ku Klux Klan) ;  
~ o l l i F v .  Smith,  578 F.2d 1197 ( 7 t h  C i r . ) ,  c e r t .  den ied  439 U.S. 916 (1978) 
(Nazi propaganda) .  
651 E.g. ,  J a c o b s ,  " P a t t e r n s  of Violance:  A Femin is t  P e r s p e c t i v e  on 
t h e  ~ Z u l a t i o n  of Pornography," 7  Harv. Women's L.J. 5 (1984). 
demonstrate this point. If the correlation becomes more evident, it is pos- 
sible that courts will become more sympathetic to this argument. However, 
only a small portion of such material is now viewed as constitutionally un- 
protected, and it is unlikely that this will change substantially in the for- 
seeable future. 
